A visit by US President Donald Trump to China in May 2026, and apparent concessions on arms exports, could result in higher tensions in the Taiwan Strait in the months ahead.

In particular, Beijing may step up pressure in response to Trump’s seeming insouciance on Taiwan, although some form of trade “quarantine” is perhaps more likely than an outright invasion or blockade. 

The visit

Of note in the May 2026 visit to Beijing was Trump’s statement that arms sales to Taiwan were a “bargaining chip”; his comments thus departed from an historic US unwillingness to treat arms sales as negotiable.

Of course, these words may yet amount to little.  A strong consensus in the US Congress stands behind arms sales to Taiwan, one of the “six assurances” given by Washington in 1982.    

Yet Beijing has sought to bank this statement as a concession, and may now decide to step up pressure on Taiwan, perhaps calculating that the US will not respond.

What comes next?

A risk is that tensions will continue to rise in the months ahead, then, as China puts more pressure on Taiwan, possibly leading to deployments that escalate into an overt conflict.  An exchange of fire between Taiwanese and PRC coast guard vessels, for instance, or the accidental downing of an aircraft, could escalate into an exchange of fire.

That said, China is unlikely to risk direct conflict, notwithstanding the looming 100^th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”) in 2027, as doing so would be immensely risky in this era of cheap drones and missiles, which can quickly turn narrow seas such as the Taiwan Strait into “kill zones”.

A full-scale blockade is another option, akin to that imposed by the US on Cuba in 1962.  That would be extremely risk, too, though.  Recent table-top studies demonstrate that a blockade could easily tip into direct exchanges of fire.

A quarantine?

China has other tools with which to work, though. 

In particular, Beijing could choose to impose trading rules on goods heading to Taiwan (such as fruit requiring phytosanitary inspections), or on transit to a port such Kaohsiung or Keelung.  The PRC might demand compliance from shippers, threatening interdiction or diversion to Chinese ports in cases of non-adherence. 

Beijing certainly has the capacity to enforce such a trade “quarantine”.  Its powerful coast guard could act as the “frontline”, backed up by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (“PLAN”), and supported by an informal “maritime militia”, as with Chinese practice in the South China Sea.   

From Beijing’s perspective, part of the appeal is that this approach would bolster claims to sovereignty over Taiwan, but is less liable to provoke a US or Japanese military response than a blockade. 

A quarantine could also operate on a “ratchet” basis, starting small, but tightening over time, and coming to represent a new normal to which outsiders might accede.   

After all, it is worth recalling that PLA deployments around Taiwan increased massively after the visit of then Speaker of House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in August 2022, but that four years later large-scale deployments are seen as almost routine. 

Political divisions

Beijing could also use a quarantine to play on political divisions on the island, such as those between the opposition Kuomintang (“KMT”) and the governing Democratic Progressive Party (“DPP”); the KMT takes a far more “accommodationist” approach to Beijing, and could retake the presidency in 2028.

Less discussed, but as important, are divisions between those descended from Mandarin-speaking mainlanders (waishengren) and Taiwanese-speaking locals (benshengren) – a split broadly (if not completely) coinciding with a north-south divide.  Another rift is that between the ethnic Chinese majority and indigenous peoples. 

China could use a quarantine to “divide and rule”, perhaps by rewarding supporters and targeting opponents, which would build on its disinformation and United Front tactics. 

The risks

All told, then, the risks of a trade quarantine on Taiwan of some form is rising in the wake of President Trump’s visit to Beijing.